


W. 55: 42

OUR CHINESE ALLY



EM 42

G I ROUNDTABLE



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This pamphlet is one of a series made available by the War Department under the series title *G. I. Roundtable*. As the general title indicates, *G. I. Roundtable* pamphlets provide material which information-education officers may use in conducting group discussions or forums as part of an off-duty education program.

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Specific suggestions for the discussion or forum leader who plans to use this pamphlet will be found on page 57.

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
OUR CHINESE ALLY

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OUR CHINESE ALLY

HALF the people in the world live in Asia, and about half of that half are Chinese. Hardly any of the other people in Asia rule themselves. The Chinese do rule themselves. For this reason alone what the Chinese do and what happens to them is important to everybody.

Many American soldiers in China today are wishing that they understood more of what China is all about. They wish they had studied some Chinese history at school along with Ancient and Modern European history. They wish that they had read some books about modern China before being plunged into the middle of it, for they suddenly realize that they do not know the answers to the simplest questions: What kind of government does China have? What kind of religion? What is the Chinese system of writing, which looks so different from ours? Why is there so much poverty and dirt and disease?

Or, if they know the answers to such questions, there are others in their minds. What is there about the Chinese that has enabled them to resist Japan for seven years, almost with their bare hands? Is China really a democracy? Who are the Chinese Communists? Will there be civil war in China after Japan is defeated? Will there be opportunities for foreign trade? Does China have imperialistic ambitions in Asia?


The answers to these questions are becoming increasingly interesting and important. The purpose of this pamphlet is to present a background which will help you to interpret

the problems and events of modern China, about which you see so much in the newspapers and magazines.

WHERE IS CHINA AND WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?

To understand a country we need to know a little of its geography. China is not unlike the United States in size and even in shape. They lie at about the same distance between the north pole and the equator, and they have many similarities in climate and vegetation.

Siberia stretches to the north of China much as Canada lies to the north of the United States, and on the south and southwest of China, French Indo-China and Burma correspond roughly to Mexico. Peiping stands almost exactly on latitude 40 while New York is just a little above 40. From



MAP OF THE UNITED STATES SUPERIMPOSED ON THE MAP OF CHINA
IN CORRESPONDING LATITUDES

Reprinted from Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, *Making of Modern China*
Courtesy of W. W. Norton & Company

Peiping to China's westernmost frontiers is about as far as from New York to Oregon. Just as New England reaches up to the east and north of New York, Manchuria extends to the northeast of Peiping.

North and South

China's climate, like ours, is cold in the north, hot in the south, and temperate in between, with much the same seasonal changes. In Manchuria there are forests like those in our Northwest and vast wheat fields like those of the Dakotas. In Mongolia and the northwest provinces there are deserts that look much like ours in Arizona and New Mexico. Rising abruptly from the flat plain of Peiping, the bare yellow hills and little groves of trees look much like a landscape in northern California. The Yangtze Valley is green and fertile like the Carolinas. Farther south, China is as semitropical as Florida, while Yunnan has the flowers and fruits and sunshine of southern California.

Our greatest waterway, the Mississippi, runs from north to south, while the Yangtze runs from west to east. The Yangtze is in some ways even more important than the Mississippi. Ocean-going steamers can navigate it for six hundred miles to the great inland port of Hankow.

South China has more rain than our south and the country is therefore greener, with rice as the principal crop. Regular rainfall explains the rich growth of trees in the south, where much of the country in ancient times was covered with forest. Now most of the forests have been cut off and the hillsides terraced to grow rice.


North China is a good deal drier than our north, and the landscape is more brown and yellow. Wheat, millet, and corn grow in the north, together with all the fruits and vegetables that we know in New England. In most of North China there

probably never was heavy forest, even in ancient times, partly because of scant rainfall and partly because of the nature of the soil. In Manchuria, however, particularly near the Siberian border, there are remnants of great and noble ancient forests.

China's Provinces

The provinces of China correspond to the American states. There are twenty-eight provinces, not counting Outer Mongolia and Tibet. These two, though technically a part of China, have certain claims to self-government.

The expression "China Proper," which is quite often heard,



THE PROVINCES OF CHINA
Courtesy of Institute of Pacific Relations and John Day

applies to the eighteen provinces that lie south of the Great Wall. In these provinces the overwhelming majority of the people are Chinese and have been Chinese for many centuries.

The other ten provinces stretch in a wide band between the Great Wall and the Siberian frontier. They reach from the Pacific in the east to the huge mountain ranges which in the west divide China from India, and include the three provinces of Manchuria, the four of Inner Mongolia, two carved from the eastern side of Tibet, and Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. Except for Manchuria these provinces are peopled largely by non-Chinese races. All of them taken together cover an area about as large as the eighteen provinces of China Proper, but their population amounts to only about 10 per cent of China's total population. The opening of modern communication by road, rail, and air, and the development of mines and other sources of industrial raw materials will soon add tremendously to the importance of the marginal provinces of China and the great outer territories of Tibet and Outer Mongolia.

Thirty Centuries of Isolation

There is one important geographical difference between the United States and China. Instead of living between two vast oceans like the Americans, the Chinese have on their west a deep barrier of desert and mountain ranges. During all but the last two of China's thirty centuries, however, the ocean frontier has been a more complete barrier to foreign intercourse than the land frontier.

The art of sailing was never highly developed by the Chinese and, although their medieval navigators made a few voyages as far as Arabia and Africa, they kept close to land and depended on the regularity of the monsoon winds, blowing for six months from southwest to northeast and six months from northeast to southwest. After Magellan's voyage around

the world in the 1520's, European navigators and Americans later on began to reach China by sea, but until comparatively recent times China's chief intercourse with the rest of the world was by land across the western borders.

The land approaches to the Near and Middle East have been in use from the most ancient times. About two thousand years ago, when the Roman Empire reached the height of its development, the civilization of China was quite as mature and elaborate as that of Rome and, while these two empires were separated from each other by vast mountain ranges and waterless deserts, there was some exchange both of things and of ideas. The silks, furs, rhubarb, and cinnamon of China reached markets in India, Arabia, and the Roman Empire, and to China in return came ivory, tortoise shell, precious stones, horses of fine Central Asian breeds, and asbestos. Chinese caravans did not travel all the way to Rome, but made shorter journeys to oases in the Central Asian desert where they exchanged their wares with traders who had bought cargoes from other caravans coming from the west.

Ideas also traveled. Foreign influences in Chinese art can be traced from the ages of stone and bronze. Buddhism was introduced from India in the first century A.D. and Mohammedanism found its way to China from Arabia by way of Central Asia. Yet all this time probably no lady of ancient Rome who wore fine silk from China ever saw a Chinese and very few Chinese Buddhists ever saw a native of India. China was not entirely cut off from the rest of the world, but it was remote and detached.

In the nineteenth century, when steam succeeded sail, the nations who were masters of the seas broke down that isolation. Today, in the stress of war, the sea approaches to China have been again cut off, but at the same time new approaches have been opened by land and air, from Central Asia and from the far southwest. In the next chapter of history China

will be open all around, from the land as well as from the sea. The times in which we are now living no longer allow China or any other country to be isolated.

WHO ARE THE CHINESE?

Of every five persons in the world, one is Chinese. What are these people like who form so large a portion of the human race? Many writers and travelers from China have tried to make us believe that the Chinese are just about as different from us as human beings could be. They have described them as backward, exotic, mysterious, even sinister, because quaint picturesque people made travel books more interesting. It is difficult for Westerners to learn the Chinese language well, and the fact that few of us have been able to talk freely with Chinese or read their literature has helped to make them seem difficult to understand. The truth is, however, that they are much more like us than we have been led to suppose.

It is as hard to describe a "typical Chinese" as it is a "typical Englishman." Would you choose a London cockney, an Oxford scholar, a country squire, or a "man about town"? There are as many "typical" Chinese as there are "typical" Britishers. But one thing it is safe to say—the exotic and inscrutable Chinese depicted in American fiction is no more true to life than the la-di-da Englishman with an exaggerated Oxford accent so popular in our plays and stories.

There are a few characteristics, however, which most people who know the Chinese will agree are typical.

What Are Chinese Like?

The typical Chinese is honest. Foreigners coming to China for a short time sometimes question this and fret about the Chinese practice of "squeeze," which seems dishonest accord-

ing to American custom. This judgment, however, is based on lack of understanding of the Chinese custom. Chinese who buy groceries, collect taxes, and do many other forms of business for others, large and small, are by common consent entitled to keep for themselves a small percentage of the money passing through their hands. This "squeeze" is a recognized practice, like brokerage, and therefore not actually dishonest. It is only when the percentage becomes unduly large that "squeeze" can be classed as graft.

Foreigners, on the other hand, are often amazed to discover that in China a man's word is really as good as his bond. Many large deals are made and contracts let without any written document, and it is just as much the custom in China to live up to these verbal agreements as it is the custom in America to live up to a written contract—though of course, in China as in America, there are men who will wriggle out of any contract.

Men who laugh at the same things are not apt to misunder-



stand each other. The typical Chinese has a very keen sense of humor and one much nearer to the American sense of humor than that of many other peoples.

Chinese, like Americans, relish mother-in-law jokes. They also have "Scotch" jokes, which are told about the people of Shansi province. Nor is China lacking in stories which are the equivalent of the one about the traveling salesman and the farmer's daughter. Not only is Chinese humor a good deal like American humor, but Chinese good humoredness is also much like American good humoredness. The jolly, perspiring, jostling crowd that gathers at a Chinese country fair is not very different from an American crowd on the day a circus comes to town.

The typical Chinese is in many ways more "civilized" than we are. He does not admire directness and frankness the way we do. In fact, he thinks these characteristics are rather barbarian and unsubtle. He is more tactful, his chief concern being to make the other fellow feel comfortable, to give him "face," rather than to tell the truth. This comes from thousands of years of having to get along with each other, often in crowded and uncomfortable surroundings. And this is one reason why we like the Chinese. They know better than any people on earth how to make the awkward foreigner feel comfortable and happy. Foreigners, however, occasionally find this tactfulness exaggerated and the emphasis on face irritating and incomprehensible.

The typical Chinese is naturally democratic, and in this he is as much like most Americans as he is unlike most Japanese. In the Japanese language there are whole separate vocabularies for ordering servants about, for keeping your wife in her place as a subordinate being, or for showing servility to your social superiors. The Chinese are not like this. They have ceremonial ways of saying things, but they use these formalities on occasions when it is polite for each man to

act as if the other were well educated, financially well off, and socially important—regardless of whether either of them actually is all these things. But as soon as the ice is broken, Chinese like to be easy and informal with each other, much like Americans. Above all, no matter how poor, badly dressed, or uneducated a Chinese is, you must, when you first speak to him, show your respect for him as an independent human being. To treat him in any way as socially inferior is bad mannered and is regarded as showing that you yourself are ill-bred. A further Chinese characteristic is that anybody will pick up a casual conversation with a boatman, ricksha puller, or mule-cart driver in the same friendly way that Americans talk with taxi drivers. They feel that the act of paying money for personal services is made more civilized by friendly conversation.

Most people think of the Chinese as being more philosophical than Americans. This is only partly true. In the old China, everything was pretty well settled. The life story of the average man was something that had been repeating itself for centuries. There was very little reason for supposing that the world as a whole was going to get noticeably better in the next few years. It was rather obvious that very few poor men got rich quickly, while anyone who looked around him could see that it was quite common for people who were fairly well off to meet sudden disaster in the way of flood or famine or disease. All of this tended to encourage a philosophical acceptance of fate, and even to make successful people feel that their success was due as much to luck as to merit.

Americans are different in this respect, because we are still a young people in a new country. According to our tradition, there is always another opportunity around the corner; even if what you are doing now turns out to be a failure, you are as likely to get another chance as the next man is. Chinese

philosophicalness is changing, however. The things that are happening in modern China affect the whole people and go far beyond the good luck or bad luck of individuals. The horizon of the future promises far more than a mere repetition of the past; it is crowded with new prospects and new opportunities. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising to find that the younger Chinese are much less philosophical and fatalistic than their parents, and more like Americans—restless, eager, experimental, ready to assert that what you do for yourself counts more than what happens to you.

Where Do the Chinese Live?

There is no accurate census of the population of China. The most generally accepted estimate is 450,000,000, but the true number may be nearer to 500,000,000 or considerably more than three times the population of the United States. This enormous population is very unevenly distributed. One-third of the area of China Proper contains no less than six-sevenths of the people. This area of dense population is in the east, in the lower valleys of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers and the rice-growing areas south of the Yangtze.

The general practice is that wherever irrigation is possible the land is watered and cultivated with minute care in small plots which resemble market gardens more than they do an American farm. There is also a relationship between cities and farming that is quite different from that in America. In China, the biggest cities do not stand apart from the most important farming regions, but right in the middle of them. This is not only because the farms feed the cities. It is also because the most important fertilizer is human excrement—known throughout the Orient as “night soil.” Instead of being disposed of through sewage systems, this fertilizer is collected and sold to the farmers near the cities. A large Chinese city, seen from the air, is surrounded by concentric circles of

different shades of green. The densest growth and the darkest green is nearest the city, where the fertilizer is cheapest and most plentiful. The crop yield per acre diminishes in proportion to the distance from the source of fertilizer in the city.

More than 80 per cent of the Chinese people are farmers, and the typical farmer does not live in a house in the middle of his own land, like the American farmer, but in a village. A city in the densely populated part of China is therefore not surrounded by residential suburbs, but by clusters of villages.

Two Occupational Groups

Before the war two occupational groups of Chinese might have been called the largest in China as a whole. They are still two of the most important groups, but their importance relative to each other is changing in a way which typifies the emergence of the new China out of the old China. One of these types is the peasant, the other is the landlord-gentleman.

Judged numerically, since four-fifths of the people live by farming, the typical or average Chinese is a peasant—just the kind of simple, honest, limited, but shrewd and likeable peasant we have come to know through *The Good Earth* and other books by Pearl Buck. Comparatively few Chinese farmers own the land they cultivate, and exorbitant rents and taxes have kept their standard of living very low. They are indus-



trious and self-reliant, however, and go ahead rapidly when not too much restricted by the paternalism and oppression which have been traditional in China.

Both the paternalism and the oppression trace back to the gentry, or landlord class, in the Chinese Empire before 1911. These gentry are the Chinese that Lin Yutang had chiefly in mind when he wrote *My Country and My People*. From the landlords' families came the old-fashioned scholars whose long fingernails were the proof that they did no physical work, and who combined the grossest corruption (particularly as officials appropriating squeeze from state revenues) with the most delicate artistic refinement and the most subtle training of the intellect. The power of the landlords rested on the fact that grain, accumulated and stored, was until very recently the standard of wealth. This made the landlords more powerful than the merchants, because the landlords actually controlled agriculture. In fact, merchants were often merely the agents of landlords.

Almost all the officials—the “mandarins” of the empire—came from the landlord-gentry class. It is true that according to the law of the empire the way to appointment was through the public examinations, which anybody could take, but since the knowledge of literature and philosophy required for these examinations demanded years of study, the sons of landlords, who did not have to work in the fields and could study at home with private tutors, had a big advantage over the sons of peasants. Accordingly, while peasants did occasionally rise to high official rank, the vast majority of mandarins came from families which produced a regular crop of candidates for the examinations, generation after generation.

Modern Chinese

China's contact with the West in the nineteenth century began a new process which has meant the gradual destruction

of the old way of life. Today many of China's leaders come from families that continue to hold large landed properties but at the same time are active in trade, industry, and banking.

The artisan class is being rapidly changed into an industrial proletariat, divorced from the villages and the peasant family standard. The last to be affected have been the peasants. This makes the fate of the peasant decisive for the nation. If he is to be held down to the old way of life while the rest of the nation changes, then China will become a vast Japan, with an industrial development high in certain activities, but uneven as a whole, and with a disastrous and widening gap, as in Japan, between the mechanical progress of the factories and the human-labor standard of the farm. Either the peasant must be granted equal rights to progress with the rest of the nation or else the low standards of human labor on the farm will drag down the wages and standards of factory labor and undermine the whole national economy—again, as in Japan.

THE OLDEST LIVING CIVILIZATION

An old missionary student of China once remarked that Chinese history is "remote, monotonous, obscure, and—worst of all—there is too much of it." China has the longest continuous history of any country in the world—3,500 years of written history. And even 3,500 years ago China's civilization was old! This in itself is discouraging to the student, particularly if we think of history as a baffling catalogue of who begat somebody, who succeeded somebody, who slew somebody, with only an occasional concubine thrown in for human interest. But taken in another way, Chinese history can be made to throw sharp lights and revealing shadows on the story of all mankind—from its most primitive beginnings, some of

which were in Asia, to its highest point of development in philosophy and religion, literature and art.

In art and philosophy, many people think, no culture has ever surpassed that of China in its great creative periods. In material culture, though we think of the roots of our own civilization as being almost entirely European, we have also received much from Asia—paper, gunpowder, the compass, silk, tea, and porcelain.

We Were Once the “Backward” Ones

There is nothing like a brief look at Chinese history to give one a new and wholesome respect for the Chinese people. We are likely today to think of the Chinese as a “backward” people who are less civilized than we are, and it is true that in what we carelessly speak of as civilization—mechanization and the fruits of scientific discovery—they have, in the last hundred years, lagged behind the procession and are only beginning to catch up. There are reasons for this temporary backwardness which we will take up later. It is wholesome to realize, however, that this attitude of superiority on the part of Western nations has existed for only about a hundred years.

Until the Opium War of 1840-42 the European merchants and voyagers who reached the distant land of China had looked upon the Chinese with a good deal of awe as a people of superior culture. They still had much the same attitude as Marco Polo, who, in the thirteenth century,¹ had told the people of Italy that China under the rule of the Mongols had a much more centralized and efficient system of government than European countries had. Coming from the banking and trading city of Venice, he admired the wide use of paper money in China. To a Europe which had not yet begun to use coal he also described how the Chinese mined and burned a kind of stone which was much superior to wood as fuel.

COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL CHART

	WESTERN WORLD	DYNASTIES	CHINESE WORLD	
B.C.	Hammurabi	HSIA	NEOLITHIC AGE. Agricultural communities in Yellow River valley cultivated loess soil with stone tools. Domesticated dog and pig. Hunting and fishing tribes in Yangtse valley.	B.C.
1800	BRONZE AGE			1800
1700		SHANG		1700
1600				1600
1500	EGYPTIAN NEW EMPIRE		BRONZE AGE. Primitive Yellow River city states. Probable use of irrigation. Shang-inscribed bones give base line of history. Sheep and goats domesticated. Writing. Beautiful bronze castings. Potter's wheel. Stone carving. Silk culture and weaving. Wheeled vehicles.	1500
1400	Moses			1400
1300	Trojan War			1300
1200				1200
1100	IRON AGE			1100
1000	Solomon	CHOU	ANCIENT FEUDALISM. Expansion from Yellow River to Yangtse valley. "City and country" cells. Increased irrigation. Eunuchs. Horse-drawn war chariots. 841 B.C. earliest authenticated date.	1000
900	Lycurgus		Glass.	900
800	Carthage founded			800
700	Hebrew prophets			700
600	Greek lyric poets		IRON AGE. Round coins. Magnetism known. CLASSICAL PERIOD. Confucius, Lao-tze.	600
500	Persian Wars			500
400	Socrates		Mencius.	400
300	Plato		Bronze mirrors.	300
200	Aristotle	CHIN	BEGINNING OF EMPIRE. Great Wall. Palace architecture. Trade through Central Asia with Roman Empire. Ink.	200
100	Julius Caesar			100

A.D.	Birth of Christ	HAN	First Buddhist Influences.	A.D.
	Jerusalem destroyed			
100			Paper.	100
	Marcus Aurelius			
200		3 KINGDOMS		200
		CHIN	Tea.	
300	Constantine		Political disunity but cultural progress and spread.	300
	Roman Empire divided			
400		WEI	Buddhism flourishing. Use of coal.	400
	Odoacer takes Rome	SUNG CHI LIANG CHEN	Trade with Indo-China and Siam.	500
500				
	Justinian	SUI	Large-scale unification. Grand Canal.	600
600	Mohammed's Hegira		ZENITH OF CULTURE. Chinese culture reaches Japan. Turk and Tungus alliances.	700
700		TANG	Revival of Confucianism weakens power of Buddhist monasteries. Mohammedanism. Cotton from India. Porcelain. First printed book.	800
	Moslems stopped at Tours		State examinations organized. Rise of Khitan.	900
800	Charlemagne	5 DYNASTIES	Foot binding. Poetry, painting, sculpture.	1000
	Alfred	LIAO	Wang An-shih.	1100
900			Classical Renaissance. Paper money.	
	Holy Roman Empire	CHIN	Rise of Jurchid. Compass.	1200
1000	CRUSADES		Navigation and mathematics.	
			MONGOL AGE. Jenghis Khan. Marco Polo. Franciscans.	1300
1100				
	Magna Carta	YUAN	Operatic theater. Novels.	1400
1300	RENAISSANCE		Lamaism.	1500
		MING	Yung Lo builds Peking.	1600
1400	Printing in Europe		Period of restoration and stagnation.	
	Turks take Constantinople		Portuguese traders arrive.	1700
1500	AGE OF DISCOVERY	CHING	Clash with Japan over Korea.	1800
			Nurhachi.	1900
1600	Religious Wars			
1700		REPUBLIC	Critical scholarship.	
			Canton open to Western trade.	
1800	American } French } Industrial } Revolutions		Treaties with Western powers. Spread of Western culture. Taiping Rebellion.	
1900	First World War		Boxer Rebellion. 1911 Revolution. Nationalist Revolution. Unification under Chiang Kai-shek.	
	Russian Revolution		Japanese invasion and World War II.	
	Second World War			

China in fact had a civilization similar to that of Europe before the Industrial Revolution, and superior to it in many ways. The agriculture of China was more advanced and productive than that of Europe because of the great use of irrigation; and the wide network of canals that supplied water for irrigation also provided cheap transport. The Chinese had reached a high level of technique and art in the making of such things as porcelain and silk, and in general the guild craftsmen of their cities were at least equal to those of the cities of pre-industrial Europe.

Moreover the Chinese had gone a good deal further than Europeans in the use of writing as a vehicle of civilization and government, and everything which that means. They had extensive statistics of government and finance at a time when Europe had practically none. They used written orders and regulations when Europe was still dependent on government by word of mouth.

The historical chart shows what was happening in China at the time of well-known events in the Western world. Note that some of the highest points in Chinese civilization came during the darkest days in Europe. The central column of the chart shows a succession of Chinese dynasties. A dynasty is the reign of one ruling family, and some families remained in power for several hundred years before they were overthrown either by another Chinese family or by barbarians from the north.

In the Beginning


The Chinese people did not come to China from somewhere else as did our own early settlers but are thought to be the direct descendants of the prehistoric cave men who lived in North China hundreds of thousands of years ago. Chinese civilization as we know it first developed along the great bend of the Yellow River, where the earth was soft and easily

worked by the crude tools of China's Stone Age men who lived before 3000 B.C.

From the Yellow River the Chinese spread north, east, and south, sometimes absorbing aboriginal tribes, until by the time of Confucius (500 B.C.) they occupied most of the country between the Yangtze River and the Great Wall, and had developed from primitive Stone Age men to men who could domesticate animals, irrigate land, make beautiful bronze weapons and utensils, build walled cities, and produce great philosophers like Confucius.

At the time of Confucius, China consisted of many small states ruled by feudal lords. While they were loosely federated under an emperor it was not until 221 B.C., when the last of China's feudal kingdoms fell, that China was united as a single empire. The imperial form of government lasted from 221 B.C. to 1911 A.D.

China's first emperor, Shih Huang Ti, is known as the builder of the Great Wall, which runs from the sea westward into the deserts of Central Asia—a distance about as great as from New York City to the Rockies. The purpose of this stupendous job of engineering was to protect the settled Chinese people from the raids of barbarian nomads who lived beyond it. Much of this great walled frontier is still standing today.



How Dynasties Rose and Fell

Through the 2,000 years of China's empire, students can trace a sort of pattern of the rise and fall of dynasties. A dynasty would come into power after a period of war and famine had reduced the population to the point where there was enough land and food to go around. There would be prosperity, a civilized, sophisticated, and lavish court, families of great wealth and culture scattered over the country, and a flowering of art, literature, and philosophy. Then gradually the population would increase and the farms be divided, the landlords would refuse to pay taxes, thus weakening the government, and at the same time would collect more and more rent from the peasants. There would be savage peasant rebellions. Out of these rebellions would arise warriors and adventurers who enlisted the outlawed peasants, seized power by the sword, and overthrew the dynasty.

Once in power, the successful war lord would need to bring into his service scholars who understood administration and the keeping of records. These scholars were largely from the landlord class, the only class with leisure to acquire an education. While they built a government service for the new dynasty they founded landed estates for themselves and their heirs. As the power of the landlords grew the state of the peasants worsened and the same things would happen all over again.

Several times dynasties were founded by nomad warriors from beyond the Great Wall. The last dynasty of the empire was founded by Manchus from Manchuria, who ruled in China from 1644 until the empire fell in 1911. It is said that China has always absorbed her conquerors. Until the Japanese invasion her conquerors have been barbarians who looked up to the higher civilization of China and eagerly adopted it. The armored cars and tanks of a more mechanized civilization are not so readily digested.

Of What Use Today Is an Old Civilization?

One may ask, "What good does it do the Chinese to have such an old civilization?" There is a very real advantage, which visitors to China often sense when they cannot explain it. The values of culture and of being civilized have existed in China so long that they have soaked right through the whole people. Even a poor Chinese with no education is likely to have the instincts and bearing of an educated man. He sets great store by such things as personal dignity, self-respect, and respect for others. Even if he knows the history of his country and his native region only by legend and folklore instead of reading, still he knows it—usually a surprising amount of it. And he has a tremendous hunger and aptitude for education, which is one of the reasons why the future progress of China, once it is freed from foreign aggression, is likely to be amazingly rapid.

CHINA AND THE WEST

Japan was not the first modern and mechanized power to menace the freedom of China. It was the rapid encroachment of the Western powers after the British defeated China in the Opium War in 1842 which caused China to fall suddenly from the proud position of the advanced and enlightened Cathay of earlier centuries to the weak and half-conquered China of the past hundred years.

As a result of the great voyages which had opened a way across the Atlantic, a way around the Cape of Good Hope, and a way around Cape Horn, Western traders and missionaries had begun to reach the coast of China by sea even before the end of the seventeenth century. Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch merchants came in search of commodities that had a high value of rarity and luxury on the European market. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the English be-

came the most numerous and active among the foreigners along the coast of China, and their trade was practically monopolized by the British East India Company.

Superior China

East India ships came to China primarily for cargoes of silk, tea, and porcelain. The first flowered wallpaper used in Europe also came from China. In return the Chinese bought such luxury goods as clocks and watches. American clipper ships brought furs, silver dollars from Mexico, and ginseng root which the Chinese valued as medicine. But on the whole the Chinese, who considered their civilization infinitely superior to that of the West, had much more interest in selling to the Westerners than in buying from them, and therefore all trade was carried on according to terms dictated by China. When the Chinese emperor replied to George III's request for more trade by refusing to open any more ports and making it plain that trade at Canton could be continued only at his pleasure, the reply was accepted only because there was nothing George III could do about it.

The force which reversed the relationship between China and the West was the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The Industrial Revolution had a double effect. First, the use of machinery and the development of modern science improved the weapons of war to such an extent that England had an overwhelming superiority in arms. Second, British merchants had far more manufactured goods to sell than could be sold in England and so they had no patience with any restrictions put on trade by either their own or the Chinese government. They first smashed the monopoly of the East India Company and then demanded of China that she open her ports to foreign trade and accept for all merchants the principle of free opportunity to trade in any commodities.

Britain chiefly wanted a market in China for her textiles, and all ships sailing from England had to carry a quota of cotton cloth, even though the market for it in China was as yet so undeveloped that much of it had to be sold at a loss. However, the British commodity most unwelcome to the Chinese government was opium from India.

The Opium War and the Superior West

The new British drive for free trade came to a crisis when a zealous Chinese official seized and burned a large stock of British-owned opium. This started the Opium War which ended in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. This treaty, and one which followed establishing the principle that any privilege won by any foreign country would be equally enjoyed by all other foreign countries, laid the foundation for a series of wars and diplomatic dealings which completely changed the international status of China.

Defeated in the Opium War, China was forced to recognize the Western nations as equals and to open her markets to Western merchants. From then on other nations more and more refused to treat the Chinese as equals, and China became shackled by what are known as the "unequal treaties." Whenever the Chinese were defeated they not only suffered the normal consequences of defeat but had to pay an indemnity to cover the expenses of whatever country defeated them. Partly in order to insure the collection of these indemnities a customs service was created, supervised by representatives of foreign powers, to collect dues on foreign trade. Duties were collected at the low rate of 5 per cent, which opened the way to the penetration of China by foreign commodities and at the same time prevented the Chinese from developing industries of their own under the protection of a tariff framed in their national interest.

In a number of cities international settlements, or foreign concessions, were established over which foreign powers had complete control, and a Chinese having a civil suit against a foreigner had to have it judged under foreign law. These cities were known as "treaty ports," and the system by which Americans and other foreigners were exempt from Chinese law was called "extraterritoriality."

Thus China, instead of being conquered and made a colony by one nation, became virtually the colony of all nations which had merchant ships to send to China and gunboats to accompany them. More treaties were signed as the nineteenth century progressed, all increasing foreign control. Then in 1894 came the calamitous war with Japan. Its consequences were even worse than a defeat by Britain or France might have been, for it meant that Japan now claimed a place in the ring of despoilers closing in on China—and Japan was in closer striking distance of China than any other naval power. This intensified the competition for strategic bases and economic spheres of influence in China to the point where China was threatened with actual dismemberment.

The Open Door Held China Together

This crisis was deferred by the policy of the Open Door, proposed by American Secretary of State Hay in 1899 in a series of notes to the treaty powers. The Open Door did not propose to stop imperialistic demands on China. It simply registered a claim that, whatever any other country took in China, it must leave an Open Door for American trade and enterprise. Even though it was an expression of American self-interest, the practical effect of this arrangement was to halt the process of cutting China up into colonial possessions. There developed instead a uniform procedure of presenting joint international demands to the Chinese government. This

also restrained Japan from acquiring exclusive rights, privileges, and territorial control.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Since the first years of this century China has been in the throes of a revolution in which it has been struggling for two things: to free itself from foreign control and to build a strong and modern nation with a government representing the people. Sun Yat-sen, the great leader of the revolution, died in 1925, but the movement for democracy in China is still far from its goal and his principles are the things for which the Chinese people are fighting today.

The chief result of the impact of the West on China had been to weaken her and to postpone the day when she could form a strong new government to replace the tottering Manchu Dynasty. In other ways, however, the West helped to bring about the Chinese Revolution. Chinese who went abroad to study or who came in contact with Western education in China soon realized that China must develop a strong government along Western lines if it was to take its place in the modern world. Also, the growth of modern trade and industry in the treaty ports developed an entirely new class in China, a middle class of merchants, manufacturers, and bankers who did business with the West and shared many of its ideas. This class provided much of the leadership and the money for a nationalist movement which came to be organized under the name of the National People's Party, or, in Chinese, the Kuomintang.

The political genius of the revolution was Sun Yat-sen, a physician who had studied in Hawaii and Hongkong. He built a politically disciplined revolutionary party, worked out a theory of the aims of the Chinese Revolution, and developed the methods by which to achieve them. In a series of lectures

to thousands of his followers at Canton he described these aims as the "Three Principles of the People," which are usually translated as "Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood."

The First Revolution Got Rid of the Manchus

The first revolution, in 1911, aimed to rid the country of the Manchus and to set up a republic modeled on the governments of the United States and Great Britain. It was comparatively simple to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. It fell because it was too rotten to stand. But the long task of forming a strong and representative government was not so simple and has not yet been completed.

For the first fifteen years after 1911 little apparent progress was made. This was the period of the war lords: politicians with private armies who fought, shadow-boxed, and bargained among themselves and with or against the central government. Various foreign governments had dealings with one war lord or another, in search of someone who could be set up as the internationally recognized dictator of China, able to mortgage China's minerals and other resources in return for loans. Japan, on the other hand, pursued a calculated policy of always supporting more than one war lord, since Japan did not want a unified dictatorship any more than any other form of unity in China.

During these years the Nationalists, under Sun Yat-sen, were slowly gaining popular support, but realized that they needed help from abroad in order to overthrow the war lords and set up a strong central government. After appealing in vain to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, they turned to Soviet Russia. Sun Yat-sen invited Russian technical and political advisers to come to Canton to help to reorganize the Kuomintang and build up a revolutionary army. The Chinese Communist Party, which had been organized in


1921, was admitted into partnership with the Kuomintang and helped to organize factory workers and peasants so that they could assist in the revolution.

The Second Revolution United China

In 1926 the army of the Nationalists, under the leadership of a young general, Chiang Kai-shek, began to march north from Canton to unify all China. Ahead of them went an army of propagandists who roused the people against the war lords and in support of the Nationalist ideals. As a result the war lord armies, which were not bound together by either patriotism or nationalism, were overwhelmed.

The rapid advance of the Northern Expedition slowed after Hankow, Nanking, and Shanghai were occupied. As they advanced up the railway from Nanking toward Tientsin and Peking the Japanese military forces in the province of Shan-tung obstructed them, provoking an armed clash.

In North China there loomed the threat of war with Japan. There was also the threat of intervention by Britain and America, which did not wish to see a new government in China under Communist or Russian influence. In these circumstances Chiang Kai-shek felt that he could not afford to alienate either Britain and America or his own landlord and growing capitalist class who had become alarmed by the growing left wing of the Kuomintang—the Communists, students, and intellectuals who wanted to base their power on the peasants and workers of China. He therefore decided to break with Russia and to destroy the Chinese Communists. The Russian advisers fled, many thousands of Communists were killed, and the right wing of the Kuomintang, backed by the army, set up a government in Nanking. Thus, in 1928, the present Nationalist government of China was founded and was immediately recognized by most of the great powers.



CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The struggle between the Chinese Communists and the government lasted from 1928 to 1937, when a united front was formed to face the growing menace of Japan.

Preparing for the Storm

The Nanking government was a one-party government, controlled by the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party. Among its

leaders one man stood out as the supreme representative of the China of this generation. That man was Chiang Kai-shek, who proved to be not only a soldier but a statesman who could balance all the different forces in both the old China and the new China, not merely by playing them off against each other, but by welding them into something new.

When Chiang Kai-shek came into power in 1928 he knew that sooner or later he would have to fight Japan, and all he asked was time to build up an army and to strengthen the nation. He was given only three years before Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, and only nine years before the storm broke in full fury in the summer of 1937.

Japan's imperialist ambitions had long been clear to China. During the first World War Japan had presented to China her "Twenty-one Demands" which, if granted, would have given Japan a stranglehold over China. While the intervention of America and Britain temporarily saved the situation, China never forgot this illustration of Japan's real intentions. During the next ten years, as we have seen, Japan did all she could to interfere with the Nationalist movement. In Japan the power of the militarists was growing and the writings and public utterances of their leaders were making it increasingly clear that they fanatically believed in their god-given mission to rule the world, the first step to which was the conquest of China.

After 1928 the Nationalist government had two main lines of policy which it pushed with all possible speed: to strengthen and modernize the country and to bring it all under the administrative control of the central government. Great advances were made in education, medicine and public health, in banking, mining and engineering, in communications, and in industry. Rapid extension of road and rail communications met both strategic and economic needs. The primary railway systems of China ran parallel with the coast





and had been built with foreign loans and under foreign control in order to increase the trade of the treaty ports in the interests of foreign enterprise. The government now began to build lines directly opening up the hinterland, extending its hold over the country as a whole, and increasing trade without increasing foreign control.

Beyond and between the railways the network of motor roads was even more rapidly expanded; and still deeper in the interior air lines began to reach points to which even the motor roads had not yet penetrated. In far inland China today there are actually millions of people who have seen airplanes but never an automobile, and many more who have seen cars and trucks but never a railway train. When the remotest regions, where life has hardly changed for centuries, are reached first by the most advanced technological developments, there are startling effects. Vast areas in China will move directly into the age of electric power, skipping almost entirely the age of steam power.

In the same period China's industry expanded with unprecedented rapidity. In all kinds of enterprises which had once been carried on only under foreign management, the Chinese began to show more and more competence. Quantitatively, in numbers of factories or total of horsepower, the achievements of Chinese industry by 1937 were so small that they would hardly show on a comparative world chart. Qualitatively, they were as important as yeast is to bread. Every power-driven machine in China does two things: it makes things and it teaches people. Every factory is a technical training school. The transformation of China's economy is at flash point. As in early Yankee New England when the machine was just coming into its own, the transition from journeyman-worker to inventor and skilled engineer can be made in an astonishingly short time.

The new government rapidly extended its authority over

North China, but when Manchuria joined the national government it was a political event of the first importance, for not only had Manchuria long been known for its political separatism, but Japan had special interests there in the way of railway and mining concessions.

Manchuria was not a backward region but one of China's most important frontiers of progress. Chang Tso-lin, the old war lord of Manchuria, had been succeeded by his son Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal," who had been notified by the Japanese in an unmistakably menacing way that it would not be a good thing for Manchuria to participate in the unification of China by having anything to do with the new government at Nanking. In spite of this warning, Chang Hsueh-liang identified Manchuria with the rest of the nation of China by hoisting the Nationalist flag in 1929. Japan struck two years later.



THE WAR IN CHINA

The War Began in Manchuria

The second World War began with Japan's aggression in China. Many people think of the war between China and Japan as starting after the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937. The fact is that the war really began in 1931 when an explosion on the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden touched off a well-planned invasion of Manchuria.

Japan struck in 1931 because China was becoming united. China's new armies, however, were neither well enough trained nor well enough equipped to resist Japan. China therefore appealed to the League of Nations, hoping that this would force other countries to share in the crisis.

Instead of taking prompt action to halt Japanese aggression in Manchuria the League sent out the Lytton Commission to investigate what had happened. The commission reported that Japan was guilty of deliberate aggression, but even then the League took no action which would effectively restrain her. In the meantime Japan had firmly established in Manchuria a puppet state which it called "Manchukuo."

The "Manchurian Incident" proved that in a real crisis the League of Nations was useless. The consequences have been recited again and again. Hitler rose to power in Germany and was immediately offered bank accounts all over the world. Italy went on an old-fashioned slave-catching expedition in Ethiopia. Fascism was established in Spain with the overt aid of Germany and Italy. The ultimate repudiation of common decency was the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich.

Many Americans were inclined to think that perhaps China's loss of Manchuria wasn't so very serious. There was a smug assumption that the seizure of Manchuria would

“satisfy” the Japanese for a long time, because they would have to “digest” 360,000 square miles of territory with a great variety of undeveloped resources. Actually the Japanese did not pause or hesitate. The League of Nations had abandoned Manchuria to them. Following up this advantage they relentlessly continued their pressure against China.

Between 1931 and 1936 the Japanese edged their way into North China. In 1933 they annexed the province of Jehol to Manchukuo. They then demanded that the Chinese government set up a “political council” in North China, headed by men acceptable to Japan, and they encouraged local militarists to accept Japanese patronage and to detach their military forces from allegiance to the national government.

The Sian Kidnaping

Though the Japanese appeared almost to have succeeded in severing North China from the rest of China, in that part of the country not yet reached by the Japanese the will to resist was hardening. The feeling that the time was coming for a great national effort spread back again into North China, heartening people with the knowledge that they did not stand alone.

This feeling crystallized in December 1936, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped at Sian. In 1935 the Chinese Communists had been dislodged from their position south of the Yangtze. Withdrawing in a spectacular retreat known as the “Long March,” they had taken up a new position in northern Shensi, where they occupied a stretch of territory that was economically very poor but strategically very important.

The Communist forces were hemmed in by troops of the national government, among them many thousands who had been withdrawn from Manchuria in 1931, under the com-

mand of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang. Since 1934 an important part of the Communist propaganda had been the demand for a truce between the Communists and the national government and a united front against the Japanese. The Young Marshal and his troops had been impressed by their arguments, and when Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to see why his Manchurian troops weren't fighting the Communists, they held him under arrest for nearly two weeks while they attempted to convince him that the time had come to resist the Japanese.

Instead of causing further civil war, the incident resulted in the forming of a united front against Japan and a tremendous rallying to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese began to sense a new toughness in the Chinese people and knew that they would either have to back down or shoot to kill.

The "China Incident"

Six months after the Sian kidnaping, on July 7, 1937, at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping, the Japanese made a deliberate attempt at a *Putsch* as a last alternative to a full-scale invasion of China. They had taken great care to get everything fixed up in advance, and with respect to many of the higher-up Chinese they had good reason to believe that things would stay fixed.

An unexpected factor, however, saved North China long enough to make the fighting spread beyond the proportions of a "local incident" and become a war of national survival clearly understood by the whole Chinese people. This unexpected factor was the Chinese common soldier—the man most underestimated, and often despised, by foreign observers. Even though a number of officers in the right positions had been "fixed" by the Japanese the common soldiers refused

to be sold out. In regiment after regiment, division after division, the spirit of resistance flared up among the rank and file; men refused to be marched off to places where they could not fight. Once Chinese resistance had begun it spread like wildfire, and while too lacking in organization to save North China, it delayed the Japanese timetable first by hours, then by days, and then by weeks.

Although Japan intended to restrict the war to North China, the Japanese in Shanghai felt the loss of prestige from the failure of their *Putsch* in the north. Their navy, largely as a gesture of bravado, tried to take Shanghai, with massed cruisers and destroyers moored alongside the city and pouring a terrible gunfire into it.

Once more Chinese resistance amazed the world. In the attempt to salvage its prestige the Japanese navy lost thousands of men and was finally forced to let the army land troops. These compelled the Chinese to withdraw by threatening to outflank and encircle them. The fighting then moved toward Nanking, the capital.

Out in the open country, the Japanese could fully exploit their superiority in planes, artillery, and motorized equipment. They pressed on so hard that it was impossible for the Chinese to make a major stand between Shanghai and Nanking or at the city itself. They had to abandon their capital. The Japanese ran amuck when they entered it. While the city burned, looting, raping, and the murder of military prisoners and civilians went on for weeks. Not only did Japanese officers fail to control their troops; many of them did not want to, and joined in the atrocities themselves.

So terrible were the horrors of Nanking that their military significance has been overlooked. When the Japanese reached Nanking, they had such an advantage that they probably could have pushed on, split up and encircled most of the best divisions of the Chinese army, and won a victory that

would really have crippled China and made a short war possible. The opportunity they lost at Nanking has never been within their reach again.

Trading Space for Time

After the bloody interlude of Nanking, the Japanese columns began to batter their way ahead again. It was now too late to entrap and annihilate the Chinese armies, which were engaged in delaying actions on a vast scale. Their strategy was the same defense in depth which the Russians, with more and better equipment, later used even more effectively against the Germans. The Chinese tactics were to give way at the point of heaviest Japanese pressure, but to close in on the flanks and communications of the Japanese columns or wedges. This was the strategy and tactics which Chiang Kai-shek called "trading space for time." Its greatest success was in the famous battle of Taierhchwang, when a Japanese mechanized spearhead, trying to thrust too daringly along the Lunghai Railway from the coastal railway system to the Peiping-Hankow line, was cut off and almost annihilated by the Chinese.

In spite of the skill with which the Chinese forced the Japanese to fight their kind of war, the Japanese had one advantage. They had a navy, and the Yangtze River is so deep and wide that ocean-going vessels and large cruisers can steam all the way up to Hankow, in the heart of the country. It was as if America, with no navy, were fighting an invader whose navy could steam all the way up the Mississippi to St. Louis.

Although the Chinese front was never shattered, its flank was repeatedly turned along the Yangtze, and toward the end of 1938 the Japanese navy enabled the land forces to reach Hankow and simultaneously to take the great city of Canton

on the coast. These losses deprived the Chinese of both ends of the strategically important Canton-Hankow railway; but they have never lost control of the inland section of the line.

Magnetic Warfare and Guerilla Fighting

A new phase of the war began after the fall of Hankow and Canton at the end of 1938, and lasted until December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. With the Japanese navy in control of the coast and the Yangtze, the Chinese could receive no more supplies by ship and rail except for a very small trickle through French Indo-China which stopped entirely when the Japanese moved into that area in 1940. The Chinese were now limited to what they could get over the truck road from Burma, which they had in the meantime built for themselves, and over the 2,000 mile truck route from the Soviet Union.

During these three years the Chinese fought a new kind of delaying war. You can draw on the map an almost straight line from Peiping through Hankow to Canton, and this is all that is needed for a rough diagram of the Japanese front in China. Wherever the Japanese are to be found west of this line, they are virtually besieged, as they are in the mountainous province of Shansi, and at Ichang on the Yangtze. China east of this line contained, in 1937, almost the whole of China's industrial production; almost the entire railway system; most of the well-developed coal mines; the richest agricultural production; and more than half the total population. West of this line the Chinese have today less than 10 per cent of China's former industrial production; some fragments of railway; mining resources that have largely been developed since the war began; and a system of motor roads that is badly hampered by the difficulty of getting fuel, new trucks, and spare parts.

The kind of war that could be fought up to Pearl Harbor, and to a large extent since Pearl Harbor, was dictated by this division of China. West of the line from Peiping to Canton through Hankow begins the hilly country of China, in contrast to the great open plains of the lower Yellow River and Yangtze Valley to the east. It is in the open country that the Japanese get the most advantage out of their motorized equipment and artillery. With command of the air, they are able to detect any Chinese attempt to concentrate a large striking force. In the more hilly and broken country, the Chinese are able to hide their movements and concentrations from Japanese observation planes.

This is the explanation of what Chiang Kai-shek calls "magnetic warfare." Whenever the Japanese attempt a major thrust the Chinese retreat, without losing contact, until they have drawn the Japanese column far from its starting point. By scattering their defense, the Chinese force the Japanese to weaken their main column by detaching units from it. As the Chinese are very weak in artillery, the ideal moment for them to strike is when they have drawn the Japanese into country where their artillery cannot maneuver advantageously. The Chinese then bring their trench mortars into action; with these and with machine guns and rifles and finally with hand grenades and bayonets, they close in on the Japanese, preventing reinforcement from the rear and at the same time destroying the head of the column. It was in this way that the Chinese won the battles of Changsha in 1941 and 1942, and the Ichang campaign of 1943.

While the Chinese have been able to fight the Japanese to a standstill by these methods, they fight under one terrible disadvantage. They cannot convert a victory into a large-scale counteroffensive of their own, because once they come out to the open country it is the Japanese who have the advantage in mobility, concentration, and overwhelming superiority of

fire power. East of the great dividing line, therefore, the Chinese resort to guerilla warfare. The region of guerilla warfare is not really "Occupied China" as it is often called,



CHINESE THEATER OF WAR 1943

but "Penetrated China." The Japanese occupy many points, and keep communications open between these points. The bulk of the country and the mass of the population are subject to vindictive Japanese raids, but are not under Japanese

control and are able to organize themselves. The guerillas have greatly hampered Japanese exploitation of China's resources, but they have not been able to win back wide territory or strategic points. Final Japanese defeat awaits the strengthening of China's regular armies.

Some of the Chinese guerillas are irregular troops who form an extension, behind the Japanese lines, of China's regular forces. Some guerilla regions of Penetrated China remit taxes to the national government at Chungking. Some guerillas are Communists. Others, without being Communists, are on friendly terms with the Communists and borrow experts from them to train their troops and show them how to set up social and economic organization. The important factor, however, is not whether guerillas are in touch with national government organizers or Communist organizers. What matters most is that millions of people are fighting in defense of their country by defending their own homes and their own fields, and are surviving.

After Pearl Harbor

With the news of Pearl Harbor, a great wave of hope spread over China. The Chinese were sure that, even though the Western nations had failed to see that war with Japan was inevitable, at least they were powerful enough to deal summarily with the Japanese once they were involved. Optimism turned into deepening depression as the Japanese overwhelmed Hongkong, the Philippines, Malaya, Netherlands India, and Burma. When the Burma end of the Burma Road was lost, the Chinese no longer had any source of overland supply except from Russia.

Against the increasing disadvantages to China caused by Allied disasters there was an agonizingly slow increase of aid in the air, both in combat planes and in the cargo planes

flying from India as a substitute for the Burma Road. Even before Pearl Harbor the policy of the United States had been to aid China as much as we could without being drawn into war. Under this policy a small group of American fliers had been formed in China. These fliers were just completing their training at the time of Pearl Harbor, and piled up an astonishing record in the Burma campaign. They were then reformed into a unit of the United States Army Air Forces, which has since become the Fourteenth Air Force, under the command of General Chennault. This unit was equipped with bombers as well as fighter planes. At the same time Chinese pilots were brought to America for advanced training and equipped with American planes.

With the growth of the American Air Force in China, the tide began very slowly to turn in favor of China. This new turn of the tide became unmistakable in 1943 when Chinese and American planes gave a new punch and decisiveness to Chinese "magnetic warfare" in breaking up the campaign



which the Japanese launched against Changteh and into the so-called "rice bowl" area of north Hunan.

TODAY AND TOMORROW


China has been disrupted by the war more than any other country, even Russia. By 1936 it was well launched on the long slow process of transforming the old China into a modern state. The accompanying chart gives a dramatic picture of advances made between 1927 and 1936. In the next two years, Japan wrecked much of what had been accomplished by the terrific effort of the previous decade. The war destroyed most of China's industry, its railways and its foreign trade, drove the students from its universities, and compelled 50,000,000 people to migrate to the west.

When the government moved to Chungking at the end of 1938 it had to establish itself in a part of China close to the source of raw materials but undeveloped industrially and backward in many ways. It had the huge task of rehabilitating 50,000,000 refugees, more than one-third as many people as there are in the whole United States. And it had to face a wartime price inflation which developed at an alarming rate.

At the beginning of 1944 the price of a bowl of rice or a pair of shoes in China was 150 times the prewar level and still climbing. The reasons for this are many and complicated—the difficulty of enforcing a satisfactory tax system, the loss of the revenues from customs and the salt tax which had contributed largely to supporting the government, heavy issue of paper money, the hoarding of food and other commodities, lack of production of consumer commodities, and the difficulties of transportation. The government has tried to impose new taxes and to prevent hoarding but has not been able to stop the tide of inflation.

Much of the progress in reconstruction that China had

CHINA'S PROGRESS BEFORE THE INVASION



made from 1927 to 1937 and its reconstruction program for subsequent years might easily have been wiped out by the appalling disruptions of war. But all was not lost, and the process of remaking China is still continuing, though of course at a slower rate. Industry is developing in Free China. There are new schools, some new roads, and even new railroads. And despite normal wartime tightening of controls, the Chungking government has made some slight progress toward the realization of the democracy that Sun Yat-sen promised the Chinese people. If war weariness and defeatism exist in some circles today, it is not to be wondered at. It is more important for us to do all we can to bolster the morale and strengthen the fighting power of the Chinese than to carp and criticize. For China is very important to us in the job of defeating Japan.

Is China a Democracy?

Because China has a one-party government, and especially since the time in 1943 when Chiang Kai-shek became president of the Republic as well as generalissimo of the army, one frequently hears China spoken of as a dictatorship. The Chinese one-party system, however, differs from fascist one-party systems in one important respect. Fascists are ideologically antidemocratic, whereas the Kuomintang is founded on the democratic thought of Sun Yat-sen and is pledged to the creation of a democratic system. Chiang Kai-shek has promised that within a year after the end of the war an assembly will be called for the purpose of adopting a constitution and a representative system of government. There are millions of believers in Sun Yat-sen's program for China who eagerly await this day.

In trying to judge how much democracy China has now we are apt to begin by comparing it with our own democratic country. Has it the same institutions that we have and the

same kinds of procedure for seeing that the will of the majority is carried out? If it hasn't, we hesitate to call it a democracy.

This way of looking at things can often lead to misunderstandings. The most important standard by which to measure progress in a country like China is not "how near have they got to our way of doing things?" but "how far have they got ahead of the way things used to be done?" Judging them by this standard, the Chinese have made very great progress. They have made so much progress that they certainly will not slip back into the old condition of weakness, chaos, disunity, and tyranny enforced by independent regional military chieftains, combined with foreign domination of their economic life. They were slowly lifted from that condition by the long struggle of the Chinese Revolution.

The question is not one of further progress in China, but of how the progress will be accomplished. War always increases the authority of a government, because it is necessary for those in power to be able to act decisively with a minimum of debate or discussion. But in spite of this fact China during the years of war has to some degree increased the facilities for the expression of popular opinion.

The People's Political Council is one example of this. Formed during the war, it contains a Kuomintang majority, but other political parties, including the Communists, are represented, as well as members nominated or elected by provincial and city governments. Its powers are purely advisory. It can suggest legislation, criticize government policy, and call on all government departments, including the army, for reports.

Going to School in Wartime

If progress toward democracy seems slow, progress in other

fields has greatly accelerated. One of these is the field of education.

Chinese have always had tremendous respect for learning and faith in education in spite of the fact that a large proportion of the population have always been illiterate. Today there is a government policy of encouraging mass education and a great hunger for learning on the part of the masses which has already markedly reduced illiteracy. In 1940 it was estimated that in the preceding two years more than 46,000,000 people had learned to read. School children are encouraged to teach their parents, and older children form classes among their neighbors or in the villages.

Widespread illiteracy in China has chiefly been due to two facts. Chinese writing is so extraordinarily difficult and complicated that only the small leisure class had time to learn it, and books and even newspapers were written in a classical style quite unintelligible to the average man. To teach the masses to read, it was necessary first to give them books and newspapers written in the style in which people talk, and then to work out an easy system for teaching people to read this simplified literature.

Movements were started in the 1920's which are making easier the task of teaching a nation to read in wartime. One was the so-called "literary renaissance" under the leadership of Hu Shih, which developed the use in writing of the *pai hua* (pronounced by *hwa*) or conversational language, making it possible for the average person to learn to read in months instead of the years it used to take. Another, often referred to as the "thousand-character movement," promoted a system for learning a thousand characters which would enable people to read a simple book or newspaper in *pai hua*.

Because China has many more soldiers than she can equip and fewer trained leaders than she needs, the government has advised students to continue with their studies, in-

cluding those in American colleges, in spite of the lure of more active patriotic work. The epic migration of thousands of students from Occupied China into the interior has often been told. Students and professors, with what little equipment they could salvage from their bombed campuses, walked thousands of miles into Free China and started school again in mud huts or abandoned temples or caves dug in hillsides. In spite of all the hardships and difficulties involved, university enrollment jumped from 32,000 in 1936 to 45,000 in 1941 and enrollment in secondary schools increased from 583,000 in 1936 to 622,000 in 1940.

Industrial Cooperatives

Both large and small industries have sprung up in many parts of Free China to meet the urgent demand for war materials and consumer goods of all kinds. Wartime conditions however favor small-scale investment and production. It is difficult to invest on a large scale because with rapid inflation a large investment piles up too much in the way of costs before it can get into production. This condition encourages owners of capital to buy existing commodities, hoard them, and speculate on the rise in prices rather than invest in production of new commodities. On the other hand, the scarcity of commodities is so great that a small investment which gets into production rapidly, turning out needed commodities, is certain of a good profit and is at the same time a direct contribution to the national welfare.

The difficulty and expensiveness of transport encourage the decentralized kind of enterprise which uses local raw materials and sells to a hungry local market. This tends to even out the development of industrial production over the whole country, besides relieving wartime shortage of transport.

One of the methods used for setting capital to work quickly and manufacturing local raw materials into commodities for

the local markets is the industrial cooperative. Early in the war a movement known as the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives organized small worker-owned-and-managed industries in many parts of Free China, at first chiefly to provide a livelihood for skilled refugees as well as to meet the crying need for such articles as soap, candles, and shoes. Improvising simple machinery and using whatever raw materials were available, they soon had their own machine shops, transportation and marketing systems, and technical training schools, and rapidly expanded to make large quantities of blankets and clothing for the armies as well as civilian goods. Today they are also manufacturing equipment for the American forces in China.

Modern Chinese Women

Nothing more revolutionary has happened in China than the transformation in the lives of countless women in all classes of society. Women have always been important and influential in China. As in medieval Europe, an exceptional few played leading roles in history as warriors, scholars, and poets, while millions of others had an indirect effect on public life through the power or influence which they wielded within the four walls of their own homes. Only within recent years, however, have women begun to participate directly in public and national life and to hold positions of influence not merely as wives or mistresses but in their own right.

In the early years of the Republic, schools were opened for girls. As more of them left home to go to school, and read Western books and saw American movies, the rigid pattern of the old life began to crumble at the edges, particularly in the coastal cities where there was contact with the West. But at the time of the Japanese invasion the great mass of Chinese women still led the old life within their homes.



MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The process which contact with the West had started was immeasurably speeded up by the war with Japan. For one thing, 50,000,000 refugees were forced to leave their homes and flee into the far interior of China under circumstances which made it almost impossible for families to stay together. Sometimes the young people would go and the old people stay on the land. Sometimes the husband would go and the

wife be left behind to look after those too old or sick to travel. Sometimes half a family would be killed by bombs and the rest would flee. Children would become separated from their parents and wives from husbands.

This great migration not only dislodged 50,000,000 people from their homes, but it also uprooted the family system of China. Even the families who were not forced to move hundreds of miles and those who were not bombed out of their homes cannot carry on in the old way, for high prices and a labor shortage mean that almost everyone must work, men and women alike.

Today there is almost no field of work which is not open to women. Not long ago a bank was opened in Chungking owned and operated by women. There are industrial cooperatives managed by women, and women railway and mining engineers and government officials. In 1943 there were fifteen women members of the People's Political Council.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek has organized a Women's Advisory Council through which she has mobilized enormous numbers of women all over Free China to do various forms of war work, such as nursing, caring for orphans and refugees, organizing cooperatives, and teaching women sewing and other crafts.

The Chinese woman of today has exchanged her security and seclusion for insecurity and freedom.

But China Is Not Yet Modernized

When we talk of the "progress" made by China in the years since 1927, not only in political life, education, industry, and the position of women, but in health and sanitation, famine control, improved methods of farming, and so forth, we must bear one thing in mind. China is still "backward" in all these fields by modern American standards and has

made remarkable progress only in relation to the China of a generation ago.

Americans going to China for the first time are still shocked by the poverty and dirt and disease, the lack of sanitary facilities, and the poorly equipped and undernourished soldiers about whose valor they have heard so much. Americans need to understand that China has only begun to acquire the scientific and technical knowledge (most of which we ourselves have had for less than a hundred years) which is needed to deal with germs, floods, and famines, or to build machinery and modern plumbing. As



for poverty, most careful students believe that only by dealing fundamentally with the age-old landlord-peasant conflict can this be noticeably lessened.

China's roots are so deep and its ancient civilization so strong that it is probable (and many think desirable) that when China does become modernized, it will not, as Japan did, simply copy the superficial features of Western life. Rather, a new China will be created which is modern but still different from the West. Symptoms of this deep change are the new and creative painting and literature which have

blossomed in the war years and which are both truly modern and truly Chinese.

At the moment China's difficulties may loom larger than its progress. The ravages of seven years of war are serious. Chinese are not all heroes, but are very human, and we must understand that they are in a tough spot. It is to our interest to help them, and relief agencies have widely advertised their need of help. Many Chinese today, however, prefer to have us emphasize their ability to help themselves. The Chinese have already accomplished more by their Nationalist revolution and by their resistance to Japan than almost any American dreamed possible twenty or even ten years ago.

After the War

There are several questions which are often asked about China after the war. Will the Chinese really be able to establish a democratic form of government? Will the government be able to maintain order or will there be civil war? Will there be opportunities in China for foreign trade and investment? What will be the position of China among the nations after a victorious war?

The degree of democracy attained in China during the war is not an adequate indication of her democracy in the future. The long battle front in China has been relatively stable now for about four years. Behind this battle front the Kuomintang, which controls the government, has tended to tighten up discipline and to impose both uniformity and conformity. It can be expected that when the process of recovering the invaded parts of China begins there will be spontaneous but often naive and even utopian attempts to establish democratic methods and procedures. Democracy is the opposite of the system of terror and force which Japan has imposed. It is what the Chinese people have been promised for the future

and what the people long for as something that will instantly bring a happy life, free from abuses. The administrators who are sent into the newly liberated areas will have to cope with this outburst of the feeling of liberty. It is reasonable to expect practical compromises between the popular instinct for untrammelled liberty and the organized drive of the Kuomintang for uniformity, discipline, and control.

At this point the question of the Chinese Communists will become acute, but it is far from certain that it will be so acute as to result in civil war. Agents of the Communists, even more than the representatives of the Kuomintang, will have to compromise between what they would like to do and what the people want them to do. It must also be remembered that the Kuomintang, as the established party controlling China, has had freedom to teach the complete range of its doctrines and theories. The Communists, in a marginal part of Free China, hard pressed by the Japanese, have been able to preach only a wartime doctrine of patriotism and survival. They have had to persuade peasants that they stand for lighter taxes and more popular representation, and at the same time to persuade landlords that they do not stand for the seizing of private property. Thus they are already a party of compromise, and it is at least possible that after the war, instead of becoming a party of extremism, they will be found to be a party of moderation. Both Communists and Kuomintang have a great stake in avoiding civil war. All that China has gained during the national war of survival would be ruined by civil war.

The Chinese will have an enormous task after the war, not only of rebuilding what the Japanese have destroyed, but in carrying forward the process of transformation of their whole life which was interrupted by the war. They will need foreign capital and foreign trade, but they will not need it badly enough to give to foreigners any measure of control

of China's internal affairs. They will welcome business on a basis of equality but not on a basis of exploitation.

China's future policies toward other countries, like China's developments at home, will be of primary concern to everyone. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years of China's semicolonial subjection. China's part in the final victory will give significance to that symbolic act.

No longer will the destinies of Asia be dictated by imperial powers. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be expected that China will embark on an imperialistic career of its own. Chiang Kai-shek advocates a general and rapid evolution out of the colonial system for Asia, and has plainly stated that China has no imperialistic ambitions. Without imperialism it is highly probable that China will grow in importance not only in Asia but in the world. The time may come when, instead of its being important to have China on our side, as it is today, it will be important in the world picture for us to be on China's side.

We no longer live in a world of "the European question," "the Balkan question," "the Russian question," "the Near Eastern question," "the Indian question," "the Far Eastern question." That era is over. We live in a world where such questions are only local aspects of the world question. Whether we make a success of that new world will depend on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a world order.

TO THE LEADER



China's heroic resistance to the modern military might of Japan has caused many of us to wonder in astonishment how such a nonindustrialized, loosely organized nation could carry on as it has. We have been inclined to accept the continued resistance of the Chinese as an unexplainable miracle. But the Chinese themselves are driven by moral and spiritual forces, aided by geographical and other considerations, that can be understood. That Americans should understand the character of the Chinese people and government is important because of the bid this ancient nation is making for a high place among modern powers. You will find this pamphlet contains material sufficient for several interesting meetings.

Much of this material gives background that is a necessary basis for intelligent leadership of discussion about China's future. It may be used in a number of ways. The plans outlined here are intended as suggestions to be used as you believe practicable within the local policies under which you operate your educational program.

One or more forums. You have here material for four meetings in which a twenty- to thirty-minute talk is followed by a question period. Each of the meetings might cover one of the following topics:

1. The Chinese, their country, and their old civilization
2. China: Relations with the West and the story of the two revolutions
3. War with Japan
4. China's future

Careful reading of the pamphlet will suggest to you appro-

priate arrangements of these topics for either three or two meetings. If you wish to plan only one session, it will probably be most fruitful to emphasize the two sections that appear under the main headings, "Who Are the Chinese?" and "Today and Tomorrow." No matter how many forum type meetings you plan, be sure to secure the service of an effective speaker or speakers. It is possible for a speaker to study the pamphlet and make a forceful presentation, but your forum will be more successful if your speaker is already well informed about China. He will be better prepared to answer the variety of questions that are sure to be asked.

A series of informal discussions. The nature of this material about China is such that you will probably wish to organize study type discussions rather than the type that naturally develops from a highly controversial subject. For these you can very well use plans similar to those outlined above as far as subject-matter is concerned. In an informal study group, however, it would be a good idea to reduce the opening lecture to the proportions of a five or ten minute introduction that covers only especially important information. You would then prepare a series of questions which would be calculated to bring out points important for the topic under study. It is well to remember also that your group members will take more constructive part in the proceedings if they have done some advance reading. Through library, service club, or other central reading room try to make it possible for each member to have access to a copy of this pamphlet.

In planning questions for your discussion, those given below may be helpful. The list is by no means exhaustive, so that you may prefer to search out your own.

Who are the Chinese?

What are the Chinese like? Have we any accepted customs

similar to the practice of "squeeze"? Have Chinese a sense of humor that Americans can understand? Do you think that Chinese emphasis upon "face" is difficult to understand? Is the typical Chinese friendly and democratic in his ways of meeting people? Do Chinese believe in individual opportunity? Are they fatalistic?

The oldest civilization—asset or liability?

Are there advantages and disadvantages to China in having the oldest civilization in the world? Does it make modern industrialization difficult? Does it foster desirable personal qualities? Will it hinder or stimulate progress in education? How do you explain the presence of poverty and disease so evident everywhere in China?

A miracle?

How do you explain the fact that in spite of inferior and inadequate equipment China has been able to resist Japan for nearly seven years of war? Is it geography? Unity among Chinese in their spirit of resistance? Quality of Chinese leaders? Ideals of Sun Yat-sen? Aid from the other United Nations?

Is China a democracy?

In what sense can you call China a democracy today? Does the Kuomintang stand for democratic principles? How is the war affecting Chinese Communist principles? Can China go far toward democracy under war conditions? Why? Will the Chinese after the war be able to establish a democratic form of government as we think of democracy? Is our pattern of democracy the only possible one? Would it suit China? Do you think there is likely to be civil war in China after Japan is defeated? Can the Chinese government meet

the problems of the Chinese Communists after the war? Will the prewar pattern of rule by independent war lords be likely to reappear?

China tomorrow

What will be China's place in the postwar world? Will there be opportunities for foreign trade and investment after the war? Will the Chinese try to develop heavy or light industries? Do you believe that China may embark on an imperialistic career of its own when Japan is no longer a menace? Will China assume a position of leadership among other countries of Asia?

How to conduct discussion meetings. Suggestions for organizing a discussion program and for conducting forums, informal discussion groups, panel discussions, symposiums, and debates are given in EM 1, *G. I. Roundtable: Guide for Discussion Leaders*. This guide, a pamphlet published by the War Department in the same series as the present one on China, contains useful advice on the objectives of off-duty discussions, on promoting the program, on choosing subjects, on the use of visual aids, and on other practical matters. Every discussion leader should have a copy for reference.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

These publications are suggested if it so happens that you have access to them. They are not approved nor officially supplied by the War Department. They give more information and represent different points of view.

Four pamphlets which might well be read to supplement the material in this booklet are: *Changing China* by George E. Taylor, *China—America's Ally* by Robert W. Barnett,

The Changing Far East by William C. Johnstone, and *War-Time China* by Maxwell S. Stewart. The first three are published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N.Y. (1942), and the third is No. 41 in the *Headline Series* of the Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N.Y. (August 1943).

There is more about China's history and geography, and the way they help to explain her present problems, in *The Making of Modern China* by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, published by W. W. Norton and Company, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. (1944), and in L. Carrington Goodrich's *Short History of the Chinese People*, published by Harper and Brothers, 49 East 33rd Street, New York 16, N.Y. (1943).

Is China a Democracy by Creighton Lacy, published by John Day Company, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, N.Y. (1942), and *The Battle for Asia* by Edgar Snow, published by Random House, Inc., 20 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. (1941), answer many questions about the China of today.

Far Eastern War 1937-41 by Harold S. Quigley, published by the World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Mass. (1942) gives a good survey and analysis of the events within the period indicated in the title.

Three novels about China in the war years are: *Dragon Seed* by Pearl Buck (John Day—New York, 1942); *A Leaf in the Storm* by Lin Yutang (John Day—New York, 1941); and *Destination Chungking* by Han Su Yin, published by Little, Brown and Company, 34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. (1942).

Translations of modern Chinese literature also help to fill in the picture. *Living China* (John Day—New York, 1936) is a collection of contemporary short stories. *Village in August* published by Smith and Durrell, Inc., 25 West 45th Street, New York, N.Y. (1942) is a novel about the war by a Chinese soldier.

